

DYNAMIC GAINS FROM TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS

Ana Maria Santacreu

discussion by

Sina T. Ateş

Federal Reserve Board

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
[†]The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve System.

First take

- ▶ Very insightful paper!
- ▶ The interplay between tariffs and IP provisions in DTA
 - ▶ Rich dynamic framework of trade and endogenous growth
 - ▶ Particular attention to transitional dynamics
- ▶ Work in progress; first, specific comments on the analysis...
- ▶ ... and then make suggestions to enrich the analysis exploring
 - ▶ Various policy settings
 - ▶ Alternative scenarios / mechanisms

Empirical motivation for royalties


FIGURE: Licensing: RTA with vs. without IPP




- ▶ Stronger than FDI and cross-border patenting
- ▶ Higher royalties (i.e., licensing) => higher adoption

A note on licensing

- ▶ Licensing, knowledge transfers, subsequent technology upgrade
 - ▶ Choi and Shim (2023): increased citation from Korea to licensed patents from Japan
 - ▶ Akcigit et al. (2023): increased patenting and citation by foreign firms to U.S. startups following cross-border investment and in their tech classes



A) Choi and Shim (2023)



B) Akcigit, Ates, Lerner, Townsend, Zhestkova (2023)

Comments I

1. Improving the exposition

- ▶ Additional material (response functions, $\Delta Welfare$ over (τ, ξ) space, etc.)
- ▶ Decomposition of welfare effects to its sources

2. How to think about imitation?

- ▶ No profits from adoption when no agreement
- ▶ What if there was a probability of genuine imitation?
 - ▶ Would affect the outside option of adopters

Comments II

3. Fleshing out policy implications

- ▶ Independent IPR more welfare-enhancing
- ▶ Enhanced IP protection useful only if domestic innovators benefit
- ▶ Then, for countries reliant more on foreign ideas, is DTA suboptimal?

4. Adoption subsidies

- ▶ Intertemporal externality through T_{nt}
- ▶ Could it alleviate initial drop in adoption and output?

5. Regular trade agreement w/o IPP

- ▶ Mutual decline in tariffs

Market size

- ▶ Market size matters for innovation incentives (e.g., Aghion et al., 2022)
- ▶ How do incentives of the US depend on China's size?
- ▶ Larger labor force or higher adoption efficiency in the China
- ▶ Would the US consider import subsidies?

Technology gaps

- ▶ Technology gaps matter
 - ▶ Sampson (2023): international income inequality
 - ▶ Akcigit, Ates, Impullitti (2023): foreign competition, optimal policy

- ▶ The relationship between adoption and technology gaps
 - ▶ Akcigit et al. (2023), Choi and Shim (2023)
 - ▶ Technology closer \Rightarrow lower investment, higher fee

	Fixed fee	Royalty	Total fee
Relative productivity	0.141*** (0.0413)	0.141*** (0.0479)	0.644*** (0.0493)
N	1,812	1,210	1,200
Adjusted R2	0.0947	0.0233	0.4177
Sector FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes

A) Choi and Shim (2023)

	$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Investment}_t\}$	
	(1)	(2)
Relative Knowledge $_{f,c,t}$	-0.103*** (0.039)	-0.173*** (0.046)
Relative Knowledge $_{f,c,t-1}$		-0.089 (0.092)
Relative Knowledge $_{f,c,t-2}$		0.137 (0.140)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.040	0.040
Observations	71,646	56,108

B) Akcigit, Ates, Lerner, Townsend, Zhestkova (2023)

Technology gaps

- ▶ How can we think about tech gaps in this context?
 - ▶ Relative productivities as a candidate
 - ▶ Reflect knowledge spillovers from North to South, but not payoff-relevant

- ▶ Implications of DTA with a technologically close country?
 - ▶ Exercise: higher innovation efficiency in China
 - ▶ Still, licensing not influenced by technology gap
 - ▶ Empirical question: royalties vs. technology gap

Conclusion

- ▶ Enlightening work!
- ▶ Rich, meticulous quantitative analysis
- ▶ Additional analysis on some policies & mechanisms would enrich it
- ▶ Looking forward to the extended analysis!